Arctic Cybersecurity Battleground.

Russia and China’s Exploitation of a Fragile Frontier

Prepared June 2025

Author: Luca Pellegrini

A visual representation of diplomatic relations between Russia and China, highlighting potential cooperation in the Arctic region.

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Situation Overview

The Arctic is rapidly emerging as a critical frontier in the global contest for power, not only due to its vast untapped resources and newly discovered shipping lanes but also because of its growing significance in cybersecurity. As climate change accelerates ice melt, the region is becoming more accessible, drawing the attention of major powers, most notably Russia and China. These nations are exploiting the Arctic's unique vulnerabilities to advance their geopolitical ambitions, employing sophisticated cyber and hybrid tactics that pose a profound threat to international security.

China, meanwhile, has declared itself a “near-Arctic state” (China china never lacks imagination) and outlined its ambitions through its 2018 Arctic Policy. Beijing’s interests range from access to rare earth minerals in Greenland to influence over regional governance. The “Polar Silk Road,” a northern extension of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, seeks to integrate Arctic shipping routes into its global trade network. While China and Russia cooperate on certain projects, their visions for the region are not fully aligned: China emphasizes multilateral governance and economic integration, sometimes clashing with Russia’s unilateral, sovereignty-focused approach.

The Arctic’s increasing digitalization has introduced cybersecurity challenges amplified by the region’s harsh environment and sparse infrastructure. Many Arctic communities and criticalfacilities, such as ports, energy installations, and scientific research stations, depend on digital control systems. The remoteness of these sites, combined with limited redundancy in communication and power infrastructure, means even minor cyber incidents can have outsized and long-lasting impacts. For example, in 2022, unexplained damage to cables serving the Faroe and Shetland Islands demonstrated the difficulty of attributing and quickly repairing such incidents in the Arctic’s challenging conditions.

Hybrid Threats: Cyber, Espionage, and Disinformation

Both Russia and China are adept at exploiting these vulnerabilities through hybrid tactics that combine cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion. Russian cyber operations have targeted the defense policies, critical infrastructure, and government networks of Nordic states and other Arctic stakeholders. Notably, Finland’s healthcare system suffered a significant cyberattack in 2022, reportedly attributed to Russian actors—an incident that tested the resilience and cohesion of NATO allies. Russia is also suspected of physical sabotage of undersea cables and pipelines, including the Finland-Estonia gas pipeline and the Svalbard fiber optic cable, causing significant disruptions and highlighting the region’s vulnerability to hybrid attacks.

Russian disinformation efforts aim to undermine Western governance in the Arctic, amplify anti-NATO sentiment, and sow discord among indigenous and local populations. At the same time, China focuses on acquiring dual-use technologies and sensitive data through academic partnerships and investments in research infrastructure. Chinese shipping fleets, which Russia increasingly relies upon to maintain the viability of the NSR, introduce additional risks: many vessels are not designed for Arctic conditions, raising the possibility of accidents and environmental disasters that cyberattacks on navigation or control systems could exacerbate.

China’s cyber and espionage activities in the Arctic, while more subtle, are no less consequential. The Polar Research Institute of China has deployed underwater listening devices and acoustic arrays under the guise of environmental research, which can also be used to track submarine activity and monitor maritime traffic. In 2023, Canadian authorities discovered Chinese spy buoys in Arctic waters, likely used for mapping the seabed and monitoring naval movements. These efforts mirror Cold War-era tactics and reflect China’s ambition to lay the groundwork for future military and intelligence operations in the region.

The deepening Sino-Russian partnership has further complicated the Arctic security landscape. Their 2021 data security pact has formalized intelligence sharing and enabled coordinated cyber operations that are increasingly difficult for Western states to detect and counter. Joint naval exercises, integration of satellite navigation systems, and Chinese technology transfers to Russian Arctic projects have created new dependencies and expanded the scope for cyber-enabled hybrid threats. Chinese firms, such as China Communications Construction Company (CCCC), are now integral to Russian Arctic infrastructure, providing sanctioned technology and expertise that Moscow leverages for both economic and strategic advantage.

The consequences of these activities extend far beyond the Arctic. The region’s critical infrastructure, especially energy projects such as LNG, which are increasingly dependent on Chinese technology, represents a potential flashpoint for cyber-physical attacks with global repercussions. Environmental risks are also heightened: sanctions have forced Russia to use older, less reliable tankers for Arctic shipping, increasing the likelihood of spills and accidents. Cyberattacks targeting these vessels’ navigation systems could trigger ecological disasters with international ramifications.

Building Resilience and Cooperation

To address these growing threats, Arctic states and their allies must prioritize hardening critical infrastructure, ensuring redundancy in communications and energy grids, and developing rapid response capabilities tailored to the region’s unique challenges. Multilateral cooperation is essential; expanding the Council’s mandate including binding cybersecurity norms and incident response mechanisms would be a significant step forward. NATO and the European Union are also ramping up their presence, combining military monitoring with initiatives to counter disinformation and protect undersea cables.

Conclusion

Ultimately, the Arctic’s fragility, both environmental and digital, makes it a tempting target for powers seeking to exploit governance gaps and technological vulnerabilities. As Russia and China continue to test the boundaries of hybrid warfare in the region, the international community must act decisively to build resilience, foster cooperation, and deter aggression. Only through a coordinated, forward-looking approach can the Arctic remain a zone of peace and sustainable development, rather than a new front in the global struggle for dominance.