Haiti is Staring into the Abyss

As gangs tighten their grip on Port-au-Prince and expand across the country, Haiti’s state institutions are nearing total collapse.

Prepared July 2, 2025

Author: Strategic Analysis Unit – CEPRODE EUROPE

Armed individuals patrol a street in Haiti, where gang activity is escalating.

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Situation Overview

As gangs tighten their grip on Port-au-Prince and expand across the country, Haiti’s state institutions are nearing total collapse. With international efforts faltering and local leadership in crisis, the window for effective action is rapidly closing.

Just 1,200 kilometers off the coast of Florida, Haiti stands on the brink of collapse. Armed gangs now control an estimated 90% of the capital, Port-au-Prince, and are laying siege to Pétion-Ville, the hillside enclave that remains the last stronghold of the country’s disintegrating government. They have seized control of both the airport, now effectively shut down, and the seaport, where they impose arbitrary restrictions on imports. Outside the capital, gang influence is spreading rapidly, with major supply routes and strategic regions such as Artibonite, Haiti’s agricultural heartland, falling under their sway after having remained relatively calm until recently. Despite the presence of the Haitian National Police and the Kenyan-led Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), security forces have been unable to contain the gangs’ advance. In an effort to shift the balance of force, Haitian authorities have turned to more aggressive tactics. In recent months, anti-gang task forces under Haitian command have begun deploying surveillance and so-called “kamikaze” drones to carry out targeted explosive strikes. These operations have reportedly killed around 300 gang members and wounded 400 more. However, their strategic effectiveness remains limited, as they do not enable the recovery of lost territory. Haitian officials estimate that an additional 2,000 to 3,000 security personnel would be needed to change the trajectory of the conflict. In a further attempt to bolster its response, the government has turned to private military firms, including a contingent of 150 former soldiers reportedly sent by Erik Prince, founder of Blackwater, to assist in reestablishing security.

The humanitarian crisis unfolding in Haiti is a stark reflection of the country’s political breakdown. Although reliable data is scarce, the available evidence points to a sharp deterioration of an already dire situation. More than one million people, roughly 10% of the population, have been displaced by violence. The collapse of the food supply chain, compounded by hyperinflation, is forcing families to sell off their remaining assets simply to survive. Over half the population now faces high levels of acute food insecurity, while gangs profit from controlling the black market. The death toll is also rising steeply. With 1,600 murders recorded in the first quarter of 2025, Haiti has become the world’s deadliest country. In Port-au-Prince, daily life is reduced to a struggle for survival. Hospitals and schools are shutting down amid credible reports of armed attacks, while children are being forcibly recruited into gangs and coerced into committing grave human rights abuses, including murder and sexual violence. Women and girls are especially at risk: 6,500 cases of gender-based violence were reported last year, 64% of them involving sexual assault, though the real number is likely much higher. These figures, alarming as they are, only begin to capture the capital’s descent into lawlessness. The Kenyan police officers deployed under the MSS have largely remained confined to their barracks, outgunned, under-equipped, and unable to protect civilians. In the absence of an effective security response, pro-government forces have adopted increasingly questionable methods. Over 27% of those killed in operations by the Haitian police have no known ties to gangs. Meanwhile, the police have failed to curb the violence carried out by self-defense groups, which have emerged across the country in response to gang control. These groups have conducted public lynchings of suspected gang members, including minors, often in full view of police officers, and with complete impunity. Outside the capital, the situation is also unraveling. In recent months, gangs have committed a series of massacres against civilians while consolidating control over urban centers once considered relatively stable. The collapse of order has laid bare not only the Transitional Presidential Council’s inability to govern, but also the broader failure of international actors to offer sustained, effective support.

Haiti’s long and turbulent history has been marked by chronic instability and repeated foreign interventions. Once known as the “pearl of the Caribbean” and celebrated as the first nation established by formerly enslaved people after a successful revolution, the country spent much of the 19th century burdened by crippling reparations imposed by France. The 20th century brought further upheaval. The United States occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, and the decades that followed were dominated by weak civilian governments and frequent coups, culminating in the brutal dictatorship of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier (1957–1971) and his son Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier (1971–1986). Another cycle of instability and contested governance led to a series of UN peacekeeping missions between 1993 and 2000, supported by a significant U.S. presence on the ground. A few years later, in 2004, a new UN mission, MINUSTAH, was deployed, this time spearheaded by Brazil, with the dual goal of stabilizing the country and facilitating national elections. The mission remained in place until 2017.

The current crisis was set in motion by the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse in 2021. A struggle for succession followed, eventually resulting in the appointment of Ariel Henry, a figure backed by the United States but lacking popular legitimacy within Haiti. Under his leadership, the security situation steadily deteriorated, as gangs expanded their territorial control and influence. In April 2024, while Henry was in Kenya negotiating the deployment of the U.S.-supported Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), gangs in Port-au-Prince capitalized on the political vacuum. After years of internal rivalry, they formed a loose alliance known as Viv Ansanm and effectively staged a coup, preventing Henry’s return and forcing his resignation. In response, CARICOM, with support from the United States, brokered the creation of a Transitional Presidential Council (TPC), composed of representatives from Haiti’s main political factions and segments of civil society, though notably excluding any gang representation. The TPC was tasked with three core objectives: to develop a national security plan, oversee constitutional reform and a referendum, and organize national elections.

Although the inauguration of the TPC and the deployment of Kenyan police under the MSS umbrella were initially met with cautious optimism, developments since have taken a troubling turn.

The TPC has been hampered by internal divisions, often shaped by partisan calculations. There are credible concerns that members of Haiti’s political elite are maintaining contacts with gang leaders in an effort to strengthen their position ahead of eventual elections. Infighting has stalled progress on all three of the Council’s core objectives. A major corruption scandal further eroded the Council’s legitimacy: three of its seven members were accused of soliciting a bribe from the Director of the National Credit Bank, a state-run institution. The incident triggered a high-profile confrontation with TPC-appointed Prime Minister Garry Conille, who was ultimately dismissed in November. His successor, Alix Didier Fils-Aimé, has so far failed to restore public confidence. On the contrary, unease is growing over the drone strike campaign, whose targets are reportedly selected directly by the Prime Minister and the TPC, without police oversight, raising fears that the operations could be used to settle political scores. As a result, the TPC has lost virtually all credibility, both among the Haitian population and international partners. Although elections are still officially expected within months, confidence in the Council’s ability to deliver on that timeline has collapsed.

From the outset, the MSS has faced serious political and operational hurdles. In the fall of 2023, President Biden attempted to rally support for a full-scale United Nations peacekeeping mission, similar to those previously deployed in Haiti. The proposal was ultimately blocked in the Security Council by China and Russia. Officially, both countries cited the failure of past interventions. Unofficially, their stance appeared aimed at prolonging instability in the U.S. sphere of influence. The resulting compromise was the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS): a patchwork arrangement based on voluntary troop and financial contributions, without access to the UN’s dedicated peacekeeping budget. The United States emerged as the main donor, yet funding still fell roughly $200 million short of the estimated $600 million annual cost. Unwilling to deploy its own troops, due to its fraught legacy in Haiti, Washington turned to regional partners for personnel. Brazil, which had once played a leading role during MINUSTAH, declined. Eventually, Kenya stepped in, agreeing to contribute the bulk of a contingent originally envisioned to reach 2,500 police officers. That force has proven insufficient for the scale of the crisis, which likely requires a more robust military presence. To date, just over 1,000 police officers, not military troops, have been deployed. Their operational capacity is severely constrained: they face critical shortages of air support, armored vehicles, and ammunition, and have also experienced delays in salary payments. While the contingent has achieved some limited success, primarily in training local police and securing isolated government sites, these efforts have been vastly overshadowed by the deepening collapse of the security environment.

With the TPC paralyzed and the security situation continuing to deteriorate, international actors have begun to explore alternative approaches. In October, the United States floated the idea of converting the MSS into a formal UN peacekeeping operation, one that could benefit from a more stable funding structure. However, facing firm opposition from Russia and China, the proposal was dropped before it could reach a vote. China’s resistance appears to have hardened, in part due to ongoing tensions linked to the Trump administration’s trade policy. For now, the Security Council deadlock shows no sign of easing. As part of efforts to break the Security Council deadlock, the Secretary-General was tasked with identifying a viable compromise. In response, he proposed the establishment of a UN Support Office to back the Multinational Security Support Mission (MSS), with core funding drawn from the UN peacekeeping budget. The office would provide logistical and operational support to the Kenyan contingent, while also facilitating the delivery of non-lethal supplies to the Haitian National Police, these to be financed through voluntary contributions from member states. The proposal also included the creation of a standing group of countries to provide strategic oversight. Both the TPC and CARICOM have expressed interest in the initiative. However, the United States has yet to clarify its position, and the proposal has not been brought to a formal vote in the Security Council. Even if adopted, the mechanism would remain limited in scope and unlikely to shift the trajectory of the crisis. The operational needs of the Haitian police far exceed what this arrangement could realistically provide.

Under the new Trump administration, the U.S. approach to Haiti has been described by some observers as increasingly erratic and heavily shaped by domestic political considerations. On migration, the Department of Homeland Security has announced plans to end Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for more than 500,000 Haitian nationals, revoking their right to remain in the United States. In a separate move, the State Department designated Haiti’s two main gang coalitions, Viv Ansanm and Gran Grif, as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) in May 2025. While intended as part of a broader securitisation of foreign policy, the decision risks unintended consequences for international organisations and NGOs operating in Haiti, particularly those engaging with communities under gang control. On a more constructive note, the administration has voiced its intention to crack down on arms trafficking to Haiti, an estimated 70% of which originates in the United States despite existing U.S. and UN arms embargoes. Yet no significant measures have followed, and trafficking networks continue to replenish gang arsenals with relative ease.

Beyond these individual measures, there are signs that the U.S. is weighing a more strategic-level approach to Haiti, anchored in two core principles: that any intervention should be regionally led, and that the U.S. will not deploy ground troops. One option reportedly under consideration is the creation of a stabilization mission under the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). The idea has raised eyebrows, given that the OAS, a predominantly diplomatic forum, lacks the operational infrastructure for such missions, and that President Trump has simultaneously ordered a review of U.S. participation and suspended funding for several of its programs. Still, countries including Brazil, Colombia, and Argentina have reportedly been approached to assess their willingness to participate in a regionally led initiative. Brazil, which played a leading role in the 2004–2017 UN mission, has so far shown little interest. Its hesitation may reflect domestic political considerations, as well as a desire to avoid repeating the controversial legacy of MINUSTAH, which was marred by UN-confirmed cases of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers. For now, the idea remains at an exploratory stage. No formal structure or timeline exists, and given the institutional limitations of the OAS and the political complexity of the Haitian crisis, such an initiative would likely take considerable time to define, coordinate, and implement, if it materializes at all.

At the technical level, a range of proposals have emerged to enhance U.S. support to Haiti. These include drawing on the planning capacities of U.S. South Command, improving coordination on sanctions enforcement, expanding intelligence sharing among U.S. agencies and with regional partners, providing targeted assistance to Haitian customs and port authorities, and strengthening the tracking of illicit financial flows. However, much of the debate around these technical solutions overlooks a crucial point: while they may contribute incrementally, they are unlikely to bring about meaningful change on their own. Without being integrated into a broader, coordinated strategy, these piecemeal measures will fall short of addressing the scale and complexity of Haiti’s crisis.

Any meaningful solution to Haiti’s crisis must be political and anchored in a high-level commitment. While the process must be rooted in Haitian ownership and the inclusion of local actors, it also requires sustained engagement from the United States and other international partners to help define and support a viable path forward. But under current conditions, discussing a political transition is premature. What is urgently needed is a decisive international intervention with sufficient personnel, resources, and legitimacy to prevent the country from descending fully into gang rule and institutional collapse. Only once a minimum degree of stability is restored can progress begin on governance, constitutional reform, and elections. For now, the paralysis of the Transitional Presidential Council remains a major obstacle. Political actors must be held accountable, and international support must go beyond rhetoric to deliver concrete, coordinated action. The challenge is immense, and time is short.