Colombia, the Broken Promise of “Total Peace”
- Editorial Staff
- 1. 9.
- Minut čtení: 7
Eight years after the peace deal with the FARC, violence is once again surging across Colombia.
Prepared June 20, 2025
Author: Strategic Analysis Unit – CEPRODE EUROPE
Download the full report here:
Situation Overview
Eight years after the peace deal with the FARC, violence is once again surging across Colombia. As President Petro’s “Paz Total” strategy falters, armed groups are regaining ground and state authority is slipping. The recent attack on Senator Uribe evokes memories of a darker era Colombians believed was behind them.
A Warning Sign for Colombia’s Democracy
On Saturday, 7 June, conservative senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe was gravely wounded in an assassination attempt during a campaign rally in Bogotá. His condition remains critical and, although police have arrested the attacker, a boy just fourteen years old, the motive is still unknown. The attack on Uribe marks the most serious act of political violence in Colombia in the past thirty years and reflects a climate of growing tension, evoking a past many citizens believed they had left behind. Just days later, on 10 June, the Central General Staff (EMC) of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), an armed group made up of former FARC members who rejected the 2016 peace agreement, launched a series of coordinated attacks on police stations and civilian targets in Cali, the country’s third-largest city, leaving eight dead and sixty-two injured. Another major incident took place on 20 January, when the National Liberation Army (ELN) launched a large-scale offensive against the rival Estado Mayor de los Bloques (EMB) in the Catatumbo region, near the northeastern border with Venezuela. The attack killed eighty people and forced more than 50,000 to flee their homes. What makes these events particularly alarming is what they may signal: a reversal of course for the country. After a period of relative calm following the 2016 peace agreement between the government and the FARC, there is growing fear that Colombia is sliding into a new spiral of violence.
Colombia’s Fragile Post-FARC Balance
For over half a century, from the 1960s to 2016, Colombia was gripped by an internal conflict rooted in the country’s deep socio-economic inequalities, most notably, the historical concentration of land ownership. The fighting, which pitted left-wing guerrilla groups (above all the FARC) against right-wing paramilitaries, drug cartels, and the state, resulted in more than 450,000 deaths and over eight million internally displaced people. Starting in the early 2000s, Colombia’s armed forces made significant military gains, thanks in large part to decisive U.S. support through Plan Colombia. This shift paved the way for the signing of a historic peace agreement between the government and the FARC in 2016. The deal led to the demobilisation of more than 7,000 fighters and earned President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize. Unfortunately, his successors, Duque and Petro, failed to build on the agreement’s achievements, and the vacuum left by the FARC was swiftly filled by other armed groups, many of them newly formed. On the international front, the recent suspension of aid and Washington’s diplomatic disengagement have delivered a further blow to the peace process.
Why “Total Peace” Has Failed
Gustavo Petro, the first left-wing president in Colombia’s history, was elected in 2022 on a promise to pursue a policy of “Total Peace,” inspired by the concept of human security and grounded in respect for human rights. One of the plan’s central goals was to relaunch parallel negotiations with more than a dozen armed groups, including the most prominent: the Gulf Clan (CDG, approximately 9,000 members), the National Liberation Army (ELN), the Central General Staff of the FARC (EMC), and the Segunda Marquetalia (GAO-R), with the aim of securing their disarmament. Yet after nearly three years in office, the strategy has not only failed to produce the expected results, it has coincided with a sharp rise in violence. Negotiations have been marked by uncertainty and inconsistency, hindered above all by many groups’ refusal to end kidnappings and attacks on civilians, which the government has set as a non-negotiable precondition for continuing talks.
A closer analysis reveals that the failure of “Total Peace” stems from a combination of the plan’s internal weaknesses and unfavourable conditions on the ground, both of which have undermined its effectiveness.
One of the most evident structural challenges lies in the logistical and political difficulty of conducting parallel negotiations with more than a dozen major armed groups, organisationally fragmented and deeply rooted in local contexts. For comparison, the peace process that culminated in the 2016 agreement with the FARC involved just one rebel force with a highly centralised structure, yet still required four years of negotiations. In the context of parallel talks, those groups willing to suspend hostilities, as demanded by the government, risk losing ground to rivals who continue fighting, reducing their incentive to negotiate in good faith. Moreover, the government’s declared openness to negotiating with all armed actors has produced two distorting effects. First, it has encouraged the fragmentation of existing groups and the emergence of new factions, including small ones, drawn by the prospect of being recognised as legitimate interlocutors. Second, it has sent the message that violence is not a barrier to dialogue, but rather a potential gateway to the negotiating table and the benefits that come with it.
Further complicating the negotiations is the government’s inability to offer armed groups a sufficiently attractive prospect for disarmament and reintegration. Whereas past guerrilla movements often combined political ideology with criminal activity, the new factions are almost entirely devoid of political motivations. They operate as criminal organisations, primarily focused on exploiting illegal economies such as cocaine trafficking, illegal gold mining, extortion, and the criminal management of migration flows. In this context, laying down arms would mean giving up control over extremely profitable activities, with no viable or advantageous alternatives being offered by the state. In an effort to adapt its negotiation strategy to these realities on the ground, the Petro government has moved away from the FARC-era model of national-level dialogue centred on political and social demands. However, shifting the talks toward local concerns is not enough to overcome the core obstacle: armed groups still stand to benefit more by remaining active than by disarming.
Another factor that has undermined the effectiveness of the “Total Peace” strategy is the lack of coordination between the government and the armed forces. According to some observers, this rift can be traced back to President Petro’s personal mistrust of the military, linked to his past as a member of the M-19 rebel group. Whatever the reasons, the government’s restructuring of military leadership, part of a broader security approach grounded in respect for human rights, has played a significant role. More than fifty generals were removed from service over alleged abuses committed during counterinsurgency operations, creating an atmosphere of uncertainty among remaining officers, many of whom have become hesitant to act decisively for fear of facing disciplinary action themselves. Tensions between the government and the military have obstructed efforts to apply targeted pressure in support of the peace process. In the absence of effective coordination, the armed forces have been left without clear guidance or a shared strategy, weakening the impact of operations on the ground and their alignment with the goals of the negotiations.
Moreover, the government’s decision to ease military pressure during negotiations has proven counterproductive. Rather than promoting de-escalation, it has led many armed groups to join the talks with the sole aim of taking advantage of the suspension of military operations to strengthen their territorial control. Data confirms this trend: since 2022, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Gulf Clan have increased the number of municipalities under their control by 22% and 54%, respectively. This is a clear indication of the limits of the current strategy, especially when compared with the FARC peace process, where maintaining military pressure during negotiations contributed to reaching an agreement.
The government’s credibility in the negotiations has also been undermined by the unfinished business of the 2016 peace agreement with the FARC. Nearly a decade after the accord was signed, only 32% of its commitments have been implemented, fueling the perception among armed groups that dialogue with the state does not lead to tangible results. While much of the blame for the agreement’s incomplete implementation lies with the Duque administration (2018–2022), the Petro government’s failure to address these shortcomings has further eroded trust in the state as a reliable negotiating partner. This perception is reinforced by concrete events, most notably, the targeted killings of former FARC combatants who laid down their arms but were later assassinated by rival groups, highlighting the state’s inability to provide credible security guarantees.
Finally, the transnational reach of certain Colombian armed groups, particularly the ELN, poses a significant obstacle to the implementation of “Total Peace.” In recent years, the ELN has expanded its presence along the border with Venezuela, establishing bases on Venezuelan territory with the tacit support of the Maduro government. Venezuela has thus become a safe haven, allowing the ELN to evade Colombian military pressure, further weakening the state’s ability to mount an effective response and, by extension, its negotiating position. Politically, the Venezuelan government’s limited interest in cooperating on this issue has contributed to a growing strain in relations between Caracas and Bogotá.
Who Pays the Price of “Total Peace”
It is the Colombian people who are paying the price for the failure of “Total Peace,” forced to live under increasingly insecure conditions. Since President Petro took office, extortion has risen by 96%, kidnappings by 79%, and, according to Human Rights Watch, the overall number of homicides has increased by 20.9% compared to 2016. Particularly alarming is the sharp rise in the recruitment of child soldiers, which has surged by 1,000% over the past four years. This figure highlights not only the intensification of the conflict but also the government’s failure to deliver on one of the core goals of its negotiation agenda: ending the recruitment of minors.
The Rocky Road Ahead
The Petro government has acknowledged the significant challenges it has faced in implementing “Total Peace,” but has reaffirmed its commitment to the plan. Beyond the desire to preserve his political legacy, this stance may also reflect concerns that, should dialogue collapse, the armed forces would be unable to confront the country’s major armed groups simultaneously. Colombia is set to return to the polls for presidential elections in May 2026, and Petro is constitutionally barred from seeking a second term. A shift in direction under his successor appears likely. In the meantime, more than two out of three Colombians view “Total Peace” as a failure, while armed groups continue to expand their territorial influence, competing for control of illicit economies and, when needed, terrorising the civilian population. Although no armed threat today matches the scale of that seen in the 1990s, there is growing concern that the country is slipping back into a new cycle of violence. Such a scenario risks undoing years of progress in security and institutional capacity, reopening wounds that Colombia has never fully managed to heal.
Komentáře